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ABSTRACT
Who controls global policy debates on shadow banking regulation? We
show how experts secured control over how issues in shadow banking
regulation are treated by examining the policy recommendations of the
Bank of International Settlements, the International Monetary Fund and the
Financial Stability Board. The evidence suggests that IO experts embedded
a bland reformism opposed to both strong and ‘light touch’ regulation at
the core of the emerging regulatory regime. Technocrats reinforced each
other’s expertise, excluded some potential competitors (legal scholars), co-
opted others (select Fed and elite academic economists), and deployed
measurement, mandate, and status strategies to assert issue control. In the field
of shadow banking regulation, academic economists’ influence came from
their credibility as arbitrageurs between several professional fields rather
than their intellectual output. The findings have important implications for
how we study the relationship between IO technocrats and experts from
other professional fields.
KEYWORDS
shadow banking; experts; professions; fields; linked ecologies; lawyers;
economists; international organizations.
INTRODUCTION
Shadow banking scares regulators. In 2014 the US authorities acknowl-
edged the importance of shadow banking by extending official credit
and other safety nets to the system and its depositors (the so-called
‘institutional cash pools’, see Helgadottır 2016; Pozsar et al. 2010). A year
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later, the European Central Bank warned that this lightly regulated part
of the finance sector was a systemic threat due to its ‘increased size and
remaining opaqueness’.1 Even China’s recent financial troubles cannot
be adequately grasped without understanding the functioning of this
country’s distinct shadow banking system. Nine years after the outbreak
of the crisis, there is still a great deal of uncertainty over how regulators
should approach shadow banking.
The existing literature in International Political Economy tells us that
regulators and their networks of experts should rush to establish author-
ity over technically complex issues in global governance (B€uthe and
Mattli 2011; Lall 2014). We also know that state, private sector, and civil
groups are active in propagating expert networks on financial issues
(Kastner 2014; Newman and Posner 2016). Critical in this regard is ‘issue
control’ or who has the right to speak with authority on a given issue of
the regulatory agenda (Henriksen and Seabrooke 2016; Seabrooke and
Henriksen, 2017). Issue control is important for professional and organi-
zational networks and does not simply rely on organizational mandates
and agenda setting. This concept is particularly important in the world of
financial regulation, whose extreme technical complexity and exposure
grants a privileged place to the ‘grey matter’ of prominent experts (Baker
2013; M€ugge and Perry 2014; Seabrooke and Tsingou 2014). As such we
need to know more about the environment in which knowledge about
shadow banking regulation is produced.
The Bank of International Settlements (BIS), the Financial Stability
Board (FSB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have put
together an emerging global regulatory regime regarding traditional
bank finance (Baker 2015; Moschella and Tsingou 2013; M€ugge and Perry
2014). At the same time, they also cobbled together an understudied reg-
ulatory regime regarding non-bank finance. While we have excellent
information on how interational organization (IOs) interact with experts
and lobbyists in conventional banking (Young 2012), we don’t have any
systematic research regarding shadow banking.
This article addresses this gap by focusing on what kind of expertise
has been mobilized by these IOs and how their expertise relates to knowl-
edge deployed by competing actors, such as economists, lawyers, central
bankers, and private sector practitioners. Our approach joins others inter-
ested in professional ‘fields’ and ‘linked ecologies’ in the international
political economy, where a wide range of agents are considered as poten-
tially important on an issue rather than isolating actors by their organiza-
tional type (Fourcade and Khurana 2013; Helgadottır 2016; Mudge and
Vauchez 2012; Seabrooke and Tsingou 2015; Stone 2013). Here we delve
into what distinctive intellectual frameworks were deployed in debates
and who is involved in shaping the expert consensus on the key issues.
This is important to establish, given that IOs were required to respond to
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shadow banking issues on which they professed little expertise prior to
the 2008 crisis.
Eric Helleiner (2014) has typified the response to 2008 as the ‘status quo
crisis’ but other scholars found that orthodoxy experienced significant
challenges in the area of conventional banking regulation (Baker 2013),
capital controls (Gabor 2015; Gallagher 2014), monetary policy
(Moschella 2015) and fiscal policy (Ban 2015). Shadow banking regula-
tory reform has also reflected this ‘revisionist’ turn that rejects bold
regulatory interventionism proposed by some experts, as well as the
anti-regulation neoliberal orthodoxy rampant prior to the crisis. Our
main finding is that expert debates on shadow banking were shaped by a
reformist recalibration of pre-crisis financial economics and controlled by
IO staff and their expert allies via distinct organizational strategies.
The shadow banking regulatory agenda has been managed by the BIS,
FSB, and IMF staff, who asserted issue control by drawing on research
provided by the Fed and a handful of economists based in elite univer-
sities. The IOs left outside this epistemic policy community have little
influence, as do legal scholars and economists with substantial private
sector experience but no affiliation to elite academic or policy
institutions.
We show that the strategies the IO staff deployed to assert issue control
have been IO-specific. The BIS relied on its reputation for practical expe-
rience with systemic risk issues as part of what we identify as a status
strategy. The FSB used a measurement strategy to make the most of its
authority over definitions and data. The IMF called on its macroeco-
nomics expertise as part of a mandate strategy. Jointly deployed, these
complementary strategies produced a self-referential and piecemeal
reform agenda. Our findings affirm contemporary theories of global
financial governance in highlighting how IOs use external information
selectively (Young 2012) as well as how they rely on a club-like system
of experts to govern how issues are established and treated (Tsingou
2015).
Before proceeding, three caveats are in order. First, unlike research on
financial regulation examining the entirety of the policy process (see
Knaack 2015 for a recent example), our interest is the agenda setting stage
of the regulatory process. Second, due to word count constraints, the
study does not examine the role of systemically important central banks
(the so-called C5), leaving this task to future research. Third, we do not
seek to adjudicate between structural and ideational debates on financial
regulation. Our position is that institutional and material factors as well
as instrumental and structural forms of power mediate the policy impact
of expert ideas of experts in important ways (Ban 2016). Interests are
ideas.
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PROFESSIONAL BOUNDARIES AND STRATEGIC ACTION
IN GLOBAL SHADOW BANKING DEBATES
Shadow banking in IPE
So far, IPE scholars working on shadow banking have focused on the
inadequacy of the early regulatory responses (Rixen 2013; Thiemann
2014), while others looked at the role of pre-crisis regulatory arbitrage
and the search for yield as key mechanisms in the growth of shadow
banking and its role in the 2008 financial meltdown (Lysandrou and Nes-
vetailova 2015). Blyth (2013), Gabor (2015) and Gabor and Ban (2015)
brought to the fore the repo market as a site of shadow banking activity
intimately connected with systemic risk dynamics. Bryan, Rafferty and
Wigan (2016, 2017) uncover the previously unexplored relationship
between shadow banking, intangible assets, and the tax ‘optimization’
strategies of transnational capital. Similarly, Helgadottır (this issue)
stresses the link between shadow banking, rents and inequality, while
Daniela Gabor invites us to rethink the relationship between state trea-
suries and financial markets in a global financial system deeply trans-
formed by shadow banking (see also Gabor 2016).
By shifting the focus to experts and expertise in IOs and academia, this
article contributes to this debate in two ways. First, it systematically con-
nects specific understandings of the issues raised by shadow banking to
specific expert groups and subgroups. Using a novel methodological
toolkit, we provide an accurate map of who pleads for a drastic regula-
tion of the industry, for ‘light touch’ regulation, or for a reformist com-
promise. Second, our approach lends itself to establishing what
knowledge actually matters and shows that the politics of expertise is
important for tracing the origins of the emerging global regulatory
regime (see also Helgadottır 2016; Thiemann et al. 2016).
The economics profession, academic economists and
international organizations
Contemporary social science is a hierarchical field. Research shows that it
is economics, the field with the greatest impact on public policy, where
hierarchies are most relevant and rigid (Fourcade et al. 2015). This article
intervenes in ongoing efforts to theorize the influence on economic pol-
icy-making of professions in general and economists in particular (see
Hirschman and Popp Berman 2014). Regarding international policy mak-
ing via IOs, scholars have stressed the importance of academia as a prime
mover in shaping how these institutions think via chains of training and
recruitment (Ban 2015; Broome and Seabrooke 2015; Chwieroth 2015;
Helgadottır 2016; Nelson 2014).
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Our approach is different. First, we systematically assess the impact on
regulatory debates of a less direct mechanism of policy influence for aca-
demics: publications in top journals. Research on the sociology of the eco-
nomics profession suggests that economists are very active in protecting
their territory by forming elite clubs where disciplinary boundaries are
strictly monitored by the editorial boards of prestigious journals (see
Fourcade et al. 2015). Our interviews with legal scholars suggested that a
similar dynamic is at work in the legal profession, the source of a distinct
form of expertise on shadow banking. Moreover, the staff in IOs, such as
the IMF, have organizational cultures and professional incentives to see
themselves as quasi-academics who pay tribute to the professional status
hierarchies certified by journal publications (Ban 2015; Momani 2007).
Our aim is to examine when an elite academic economist, as opposed to
a central banker or private sector economist, has voice and access in
emerging financial regulation regimes.
Second, this article studies the impact of economists on global financial
governance by comparing them to other professional groups. Eleni Tsin-
gou has noted that lawyers stand next to economists as ‘gatekeepers in
the policy process determining what counts as evidence and as credible
arguments’ (Tsingou 2015: 23). Katarina Pistor’s (2013) work highlights
the critical role of legal professions and jurisdictions in the functioning of
transnationalized finance. Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth have investi-
gated, over many volumes, how transnational legal expertise is
constructed to shape regulatory outcomes (for example, Dezalay and
Garth 2010; see also Eagleton-Pierce 2017). Abraham Newman and co-
authors have shown how transnational network push soft law in the gov-
ernance in global finance (Newman and Bach 2014; Newman and Posner
2016). Finally, Annalise Riles (2011) has demonstrated how legal academ-
ics and qualified lawyers were sources of much shadow banking activity
from their work within law firms and lobbying activities. In short, law-
yers also have influence on how markets and policies are designed.
IO staff and agenda setting in international organizations
In the current literature a lot of explanatory weight is given to the intel-
lectual entrepreneurship of IO economists (Chwieroth 2015; Nelson 2014)
rather than to academic economists in their own right. For some, the
impact of academia on policy thinking in IOs is mediated by the interac-
tion between the political interests of the IOs’ principals, their mandates
and the strategies of IO staff (Gallagher 2014; Moschella 2015). Demon-
strating expertise is considered important for IO staff in cementing their
reputation with external actors, as well as enhancing their capacity to
demand certain kinds of knowledge and have greater control in policy
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debates (Broome 2008). This is particularly the case in the world of finan-
cial regulation, where esteem is held to be an important form of profes-
sional ‘currency’ (Baker, 2017).
We contribute to this literature by suggesting IO staff exercise issue
control via various strategies that include expertise production with
peers in other IOs and likeminded professionals. Three such strategies
are identified: measurement, mandate and status. Through measurement,
IOs with first mover advantage can control the issue by capitalizing on
their particular advantage at issuing definitions and metrics used in pol-
icy assessments. Other IOs can practice issue control by making the
observance of their institutional mandate a passage point for how the
issue should be regulated. Others deploy the high professional status of
their staff in niche areas as a source of comparative advantage. When the
issue being debated is pressing to policy makers, but is new to academia,
IO staff can use their first mover advantage, embedded institutional posi-
tioning, and professional status, to promote their work and selectively
use academic and non-academic outsiders.
METHODOLOGY AND DATA
Drawing on Cornel Ban’s past work (Ban 2015; 2016), we use a combina-
tion of content, network, and prosopographic methods to establish how
‘grey matter’ works in shadow banking. Content analysis processes
the content of scholarship cited in debates on shadow banking, and high-
profile reports issued by the BIS and FSB, and the IMF. Network analysis
visualizes the linkages between these reports and their institutional sup-
pliers of expertise based on the professional affiliations of the authors
cited by IOs. Prosopographic methods trace the career histories of the
experts involved and how their trajectories (paths to seniority) and career
experience differ (see Seabrooke and Nilsson 2015).
To better map out the professional field of expertise on shadow bank-
ing we turned to a conventional site of influence in public policy (aca-
demic journals) and then connected the findings to the policy output of
the BIS, FSB, and IMF. First, we looked at two markers of professional
prestige in economics: papers dealing with shadow banking that had
over 100 citations on Google Scholar or that were published in prominent
professional journals. This distinction is important because some of the
most influential interventions in this debate do not appear in top aca-
demic journals. There is, after all, no reason why regulators should hold
academic publications in regard as opposed to working paper series
from IOs and think tanks where their peers are more likely to appear.
We then looked at articles on shadow banking published in the top
journals in economics (American Economics Review, Quarterly Journal of
Economics) as well as in specialized journals in finance economics that
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had the highest impact factors in the subfield (Journal of Finance, Journal of
Banking and Finance; Journal of Financial Economics; Review of Financial
Studies).
To gauge lawyers’ views of shadow banking regulation we first looked
at prestigious publications such as Stanford Law Review, Harvard Law
Review, and Columbia Law Review, as well as business law journals that
financial practitioners identify as the most authoritative voices of finan-
cial law expertise. Specifically, we read articles on shadow banking pub-
lished in the Banking Law Journal.2 Finally, we looked at lesser ranked
journals that had a higher coverage of shadow banking issues authored
by professors from high-prestige law schools: the Review of Banking and
Finance Law as well as the Journal of Corporation Law.
To provide a granular view of the expert debate on shadow banking,
we first use content analysis to map out policy recommendations being
made using three categories: interventionism, reformism and neoliberal-
ism. Our coding strategy for each of the three spectra of policies is based
on two litmus tests: (1) the extent of advocated change relative to the sta-
tus quo and (2) the treatment of shadow banks versus conventional
banks.
Our understanding of the ‘neoliberalism’ draws on approaches that
avoid its popular conflation with ‘market fundamentalism’ and stress the
combination of neoclassical optimism about the virtues of the market
and the responsibility of the state to intervene though market-making
regulations and the socialization of losses in cases of market failure
(Ban 2016). Our use of the term ‘reformism’ is based on Cornel Ban’s
(2015) study of fiscal policy change in the IMF) and brings to the surface
differences of degree relative to neoliberalism. While weak reformism
does not aim to challenge the structural privileges of the financial system
and could be seen as part of the neoliberal nebulae, we think that strong
reformism nevertheless expresses a great deal of skepticism towards the
neoclassical view of the financial market that is espoused by neoliberals.
If strong reformist measures were applied to shadow banking institu-
tions and activities across the board, rather than selectively, then we
labeled these opinions as interventionist.3
To ensure reliability, two coders deployed the coding scheme
described above with regard to a third of the corpus of selected articles.
Then, a third coder did a random selection of the coded articles and
highlighted differences in order to calibrate the final coding sheet, which
was then used to code all articles (see Table 1). For network analysis visu-
alization we used Gephi. Next, we used citation analysis to identify the
boundaries, linkages and central nodes of the expert networks that shape
the debate. Finally, we went through the authors’ professional biogra-
phies to get a sense of how one’s professional status and mobility
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between different professional fields shapes one’s access to international
sites of decision-making.
PROFESSIONAL FIELDS AND EPISTEMIC POWER IN
SHADOW BANKING REGULATION
Status and affiliation
To map out the entire field of debate we did a biographical analysis of the
professional status and affiliations of the authors published in all the pro-
fessional journals under analysis (N D 108) and the authors writing pol-
icy and research reports for IOs (N D 59). We define status as the social
standing of an actor based on commonly agreed norms. Since professions
in general and professional publication outlets, in particular, are hierar-
chical social fields (Fourcade 2009; Fourcade et al. 2015) we also ranked
these authors in terms of their professional ranking. Specifically, we
assigned the highest value (3) to authors who were senior management
in public or private non-academic institutions, senior professors in elite
academic institutions, or partners in law firms. We then assigned the low-
est value (1) to authors occupying entry-level positions in public or
Table 1 Coding sheet for schools of thought in shadow banking regulation
Regulatory
school of thought Main implications for regulators
Interventionism Extensively intervenes the day-to-day risk-taking activities of
shadow banking institutions, in terms of the statutory limits
imposed on their economic freedom and the intensity of
supervision.
Treats shadow banks like conventional banks in regulatory
terms, without any significant privileges granted to them.
Reformism Recalibrates the existing regulatory status quo, as defined by
the benchmarks of Dodd Frank or Basel III towards more
monitoring, more data collection (weak reformism) and a
recalibration of the existing regulatory instruments, using
statutory capital buffers, compulsory insurance systems
targeted at specific forms of shadow banking, or the selective
curbing of certain financial innovations associated with it
(strong reformism).
Neoliberalism Rolls back post-2008 regulations and reverts to the ‘light-touch’
regulation of corporate governance as a means to realign
agents’ incentives so that systemic risk in the shadow
banking is extensively reduced.
Provides shadow banks the safety net provided to conventional
banks in times of crisis but without loading them with
additional regulation.
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private non-academic institutions, to lecturers in non-elite academic insti-
tutions, or ‘simple’ lawyers in law firms. We gave an intermediate status
rank (2) to authors with professional positions that sat in the middle of
these two extremes.
The results are presented in the spider chart above (Figure 1) that
matches affiliations and status positions. Its shows that the shadow bank-
ing debate brings together experts whose professional expertise is con-
centrated in elite academic circles, mid-ranking IO staff and law firm
attorneys, as well as those with low-ranking positions in domestic public
sector institutions, private financial firms and central banks. The authors
published in economics journals are typically professors in leading eco-
nomics departments who could engage in ‘epistemic arbitrage’ by
exploiting opportunities between bodies of professional knowledge pro-
duced between different professional fields (Seabrooke 2014). They did
so via professional connections to central banks, private financial firms
and domestic policy institutions (career information on the FSB is not
available as reports are not signed). The average contributor to the
shadow banking debate hosted by law journals is a middle-to-low rank
person in academia or a law firm, with minor experience in non-financial
private sector and domestic public policy positions.
Positioning strategies and policy influence
To map out possible intellectual alliances and the policy relevance of the
authors, we conducted a citation analysis that traced citations deemed
relevant by the international shadow banking regulation ‘triad’ under
analysis. Then, we processed the CVs of the cited authors to identify their
affiliations at the time they authored the research for which they were
cited in the reports. Our readings of official IO reports came up with
182 names between 2009 and 2014. We then used network analysis to
map the epistemic linkages that they developed with the regulatory triad.
The sources cited by all three IOs are the most influential (we call them
‘senior brokers’), while those that are shared only by two are lower on
the scale of epistemic status (‘junior brokers’).
The findings are visualized in Figure 2 and suggest that while the legal
profession may be prominent in domestic regulatory debates, or in infor-
mally shaping global financial regulation, it has little relevance for how
shadow banking is treated as an issue among IO staff. The key story here
is that the BIS, FSB, and IMF all draw on their own staff and on Fed
research (the most central node) as the chief source of expertise, with
selective input from academic economists.
In line with conventional thinking, the high prestige academic names in
this debate come from elite US universities. But contrary to the conven-
tional view that economists matter for high-level policy circles via their
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high status in the world of economics departments and journals, we found
that the most cited academics are business school professors who are cited
for papers showcased by think-tanks (e.g. Brookings Institute) or their
own university (e.g. Chicago Booth). All of these academic authors have
used the revolving doors between academia and sites of (mainly Ameri-
can) policy power. This suggests that IO staff care less about the academic
prestige of a publication or affiliation to an economics department than
the conventional accounts would lead us to believe. We also speculate that
this may be due to different professional incentives. For faculty based in
economics departments the rewards come from publishing highly formal-
ized research in top journals without specific regard to pressing policy
issues. It is simply self-defeating for these academics to undermine their
own professional standing by doing work that would appeal to IOs. In
contrast, the professional incentives and culture of business schools
stresses applied research relevant to the ongoing policy agenda. This
research might not make it in the top economics journals, but it would
attract the attention of domestic and international policymakers.
While global economic governance has become more multipolar and
less US-centric (Gallagher 2014), this is less true when it comes to leading
expertise on shadow banking regulation. Indeed, all the institutions that
supply senior broker knowledge are US-based, with the Fed economists
Figure 1 Career experience and professional status among shadow banking experts.
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playing the leading role, followed by top economics departments (Yale,
Princeton, Northwestern). The IMF relies on Fed-originated shadow
banking research almost as much as it does on its own staff. In contrast,
even though IMF data suggests the Eurozone has had a growing shadow
banking sector (IMF 2014), the central bank of the Eurozone is only a
junior broker in our citation network.
Even as Anglo-American academic institutions have become increas-
ingly international in their hiring patterns and graduate profiles and
even if they play second fiddle to internal IO expertise, research by their
faculty dominates the academic supplier pool for the FSB and IMF. Yet
the dominance of Anglo-American academia appears weaker if we look
at the sources shared by BIS and FSB. Here, University of Chicago and
Figure 2 Citation network for BIS, IMF, and FSB, by institutional affiliation at the
time of authorship.
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Bank of England experts are joined by those employed by continental
institutions such as the Italian central bank, Spain’s Pompeu Fabra Uni-
versity, and France’s Toulouse School of Economics. Outside of the nar-
row and elite pool of brokers, the range of institutions cited by a single
IO is more diverse in terms of status and type, with Berkeley academics
sharing the stage with J.P. Morgan, alongside a navy institute from
Sicily.
If academic economists are not important players in the overall net-
work, they are selectively important for IOs. Table 2 shows economists
cited at least by two of the following: BIS, FSB, and the IMF. The data
strongly suggests that academic economists from Columbia, Harvard,
MIT, NYU, Princeton, Stanford, and Yale play prime knowledge broker
functions. The other senior brokers are from the Fed, IMF, and the BIS.
Table 2 Affiliation at time of publication of shadow banking expertise brokers
Name Affiliation Cited by
Hyun Song Shin Princeton BIS, FSB, IMF
Zoltan Pozsar New York Fed BIS, FSB, IMF
Tobias Adrian New York Fed BIS, FSB, IMF
Adam Ashcraft New York Fed BIS, FSB, IMF
Hayley Boesky New York Fed BIS, FSB, IMF
Antoine Martin New York Fed BIS, FSB
Adam Copeland New York Fed BIS, FSB
Dmitry Orlov Stanford University BIS, FSB
Stefan Nagel University of Michigan BIS, FSB
Jeremy Stein Harvard University BIS, FSB
Claudio Borio Bank of International Settlements BIS, IMF
Nikola Tarashev Bank of International Settlements BIS, IMF
Ricardo J. Caballero MIT BIS, IMF
Charles Calomiris Columbia; IMF; Shadow Open Market
Committee
BIS, IMF
Charles Goodhart London School of Economics FSB, IMF
Darrell Duffie Stanford University FSB, IMF
Manmohan Singh International Monetary Fund FSB, IMF
Viral V. Acharya NYU FSB, IMF
Gary Gorton Yale FSB, IMF
AndrewMetrick Yale FSB, IMF
Lasse Heje Pedersen NYU; Copenhagen Business School; AQR
Capital Management
FSB, IMF
Angela Maddaloni ECB FSB, IMF
T. Sabri €Onc€u NYU FSB, IMF
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The IOs tasked to produce policy templates for shadow banking regu-
lation have drawn predominantly on their own expertise to define what
is to be done about this critical pillar of global finance. While the creme
de la creme of academic economics remained relevant at the center of
this network of influence (albeit not in the broader network), legal schol-
arship has been almost completely ignored in these IOs. The next section
maps out the content of policy ideas about shadow banking regulation
circulating in high-prestige economics and law journals.
ECONOMISTS AND LAWYERS IN THE SHADOW
BANKING DEBATE
Economists’ expertise on shadow banking
The most visible shadow banking expertise published in elite journals is
American in origin and largely reformist in content. There are, however,
important variation patterns. US-based academic and policy economists
authored the most cited journal articles but New York Fed economists
are by far the most prominent. Rather than the kind of math-heavy
modeling exercises that make one respectable in most specializations in
economics (Fourcade 2009), this flagship research is largely descriptive
micro-oriented accounts. As one of the pillars of the shadow banking lit-
erature confesses, the aim of these interventions was not so much to
show case mathematical prowess, but ‘to put shadow banking on the
radar of economists, policy makers and market participants’ – mapping
the system and identifying ‘credit, maturity and liquidity transformation
by non-banks without access to official liquidity and credit puts’ (Pozsar
2015: 2).
Among this creme de la creme of economists cautious reformism
shares the room with radical interventionism. The most cited paper in
the literature is a Fed staff report that resulted from the cooperation
between three Fed economists and a Bank of America expert (Pozsar
et al. 2010). The paper comes closest to interventionist radicalism when it
effectively demands applying the same regulatory regime to shadow
banks and conventional banks as the best way to limit regulatory
arbitrage.
Similarly interesting is the case of a celebrated paper authored by two
Yale School of Management professors deeply embedded in the Fed and
systemic central banks or in the U.S. President’s Council of Economic
Advisors (Gorton and Metrick 2010). The authors see key pillars of
shadow banking (money market mutual funds or MMMFs, securitiza-
tion, and repos) as the main drivers of the Lehman crisis overlooked in
the Dodd-Frank Act. They deplore this situation and lash out at pure pri-
vate sector solutions to ensure the stability of the banking sector. Their
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solutions border on interventionism when they demand the enforcement,
by a new regulatory authority, of strict standards for collateral and mini-
mum haircuts for repos, while treating MMMFs as conservative invest-
ment funds or as publicly protected ‘narrow’ conventional banks.
Against the grain of the conventional objection that shadow bankers are
too Schumpeterian to be regulated, Gorton and Metrick respond briskly:
‘If today’s regulators are found not to be up to the task, they should be
better trained and better paid. If instead the task is simply impossible,
then either we are destined to have more crises, or we will be forced to
live with greatly constrained financial systems’ (2010: 289).
Such radical interventionism born from the early stages of the crisis is
largely isolated and shares the stage with a relatively cautious reformism
centered around macroprudential regulation (see Baker 2013). A Fed-BIS
paper on securitization (Adrian and Shin 2010) simply upholds the FSB’s
reforms, while a paper authored by a Harvard-Chicago team of business
school professors tied to the Fed-Treasury-White House policy complex
further narrows down the regulatory imagination by opposing the impo-
sition of similar macroprudential regulations on a given type of credit
exposure, irrespective of whether it is held by conventional or by shadow
banks (Hanson et al. 2010). They argue than any broad-based regulation
should be limited to haircuts and ABSs.
Finally, the influential Squam Lake report authored by fifteen high-
status economists, whose credibility is underlined by a long history of
using the revolving doors between academia and US policy circles
(French et al. 2010), hesitates between moderate and strong reformism:
regulation with a systemic focus (macroprudential regulation) in addi-
tion to a focus at the firm-level (microprudential regulation). Despite
being some of the boldest forms of reformism in the debate, these pro-
posals fall short of the ambitious attack against regulatory arbitrage
demanded by the interventionists. In short, the creme de la creme is US-
centric and divided in terms of how much public authorities should
intervene. However, once we move away from the ‘star’ papers and look
at all the economists published in the top finance economics journals the
picture changes. The authors published in the top journals are over-
whelmingly based in elite sectors of academia and they produce a rela-
tively bland reformist consensus.
Authors agree on the deep pathologies of shadow banking, oppose
pure private solutions and demand further regulatory interventions,
albeit without going for sharp departures from the status quo (Bernal
et al. 2014; Gorton and Metrick 2012; Krishnamurty et al. 2014). Some
show that shadow banks create money via short-term claims collateral-
ized by securitized loans, and that they should be incorporated in central
banks’ monetary policy and safety nets in exchange for reserve require-
ments and haircut regulation (Kashyap and Stein 2012). Others show that
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shadow banking is fraught with frictions that create a channel through
which their risk-taking disrupts the ability of creditworthy firms to raise
financing and invest (Chernenko and Sunderam 2014; Gennaioli et al.
2013; Kacperczyk and Schnabl 2013).
While some scholars saw little ideational change in the economics pro-
fession since 2008 (Mirowski and Nik-Khah 2013), in shadow banking
the neoliberal voices barely fit on the stage and are not supported by
high status academic institutions. Neoliberal authors are also less fre-
quent users of revolving doors between academia and top policy
institutions.
The two articles that fit this profile most closely (DeAngelo and Stulz
2014; Plantin 2014) acknowledge the risks posed by shadow banking but
instead of more regulation they demand less of it. Guillaume Plantin
(2014) argues that the best way to reduce conventional banks’ incentives
to have more shadow banking activity is cut down on ‘excessive’ lever-
age-capping capital requirements on traditional banks. His argument is
anchored in a version of the classic neoliberal thesis about the regulator’s
impotence: bankers can bypass capital requirements because the regula-
tor cannot measure risks more accurately than private agents or observe
their transactions with MMMFs. DeAngelo and Stultz (2014) follow the
same line when they show that high leverage is optimal for banks and
advocate treating leverage simply as a force of nature in the market, a
mere reflection of healthy competition.
Lawyers’ expertise on shadow banking
In contrast to economics, neoliberal voices dominate the law journals.
Support for radical interventionism comes strictly from academia, while
neoliberalism is the guiding light of private lawyers and junior academ-
ics in law schools. Very few elite academics in this professional field find
neoliberalism and even reformism a tempting prospect.
For neoliberal jurists, existing regulations like Dodd-Frank are
repressive and, at best, doomed to be eventually ineffective against
the financial innovation capabilities of shadow banking (Hill 2011;
Rhee 2010; Scharfman 2011; Tarbert and Bachrach 2014). Reform pro-
posals for the regulation of hedge funds and private equity are
framed as tantamount to inhibiting economic activity across the econ-
omy (Frucht and Novak 2009). Some go as far as arguing that any
regulatory oversight system will become ‘an ad hoc and politically
contingent system’ (Coffee 2011: 796). Many see the moral problem of
banking culture as a strong reason why government regulators can-
not really do much to constrain shadow banking (Hill 2011; Williams
and Conley 2014).
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In lieu of regulation, neoliberal legal scholars emphasize soft measures
such as self-propelled changes in the culture of banking via innovative
soft law, the training of legal professionals, the voluntary adoption
of shared leverage evaluation techniques, investor accreditation stand-
ards, and pushing some systemic risk regulation out of regulatory agen-
cies and into the market (Frucht and Novak 2009). This last
transformation can be achieved in two ways. First, the government can
use corporate governance reforms as an opportunity to create a risk-
averse class of voting shareholders and dilute the equity of common
shareholders, who typically demand excess leverage to increase profits
quickly and easily (Coffee 2011). Others propose government ex ante
incentives to encourage risk management and self-monitoring, as well as
the use of derivatives markets to act as insurance against shareholder lia-
bility that would more accurately reflect risks in the capital market, thus
making shadow banks more risk-averse (Conti-Brown 2012). A lot of pas-
sion goes into articulating resistance against the imposition on shadow
banking managers of a ‘duty to manage risk’, with the argument that this
would give rise to market-distorting tort liability (Hurt 2013).
While a rare species among economists, interventionist radicals are the
second most important school of thought in legal scholarship. The stan-
dard interventionist line is to regulate shadow banks the same way one
regulates conventional banks. They argue that since shadow banks issue
money-like instruments, and therefore become part and parcel of the
monetary system through their money creation function, they should not
be treated any differently by the regulator than commercial banks (Ricks
2012). Shadow banks should be forced into the same ‘joint venture’ with
the government that traditional banks have and thus should be subject to
‘portfolio requirements and capital requirements, and… pay risk-based
fees to the monetary authority’ (Ricks 2012: 746–47).
Other legal scholars go further, crossing into forms of strong interven-
tionism no one in economics dares to advance. Some propose that in
addition to enhanced disclosures (of indicators of long-term value, risk,
losses), regulators should simply prohibit speculative derivatives trans-
actions made by shadow banks or limit them only to standardized deriv-
atives (Dallas 2011). Other strong interventionists focus on agency
reform and plead for a ‘big bang’ democratization of the regulatory infra-
structure as the only answer to agency capture (Levitin 2013; Omarova
2011). These authors argue that the capture of technocratic regulatory
agencies by vested interests mattered more as a structural cause of the
crisis than deregulation or technical flaws in supervision. Their solution
lies either in the establishment of new, democratically accountable agen-
cies, the creation of a more independent, technocratic, and politically
insulated agency system, or leveraging interest group pressure to coun-
teract political pressure (Levitin 2013).
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In between the dominant but low-status neoliberal field and the small
but high-status interventionist one stand the reformists. A great deal of
the reformist conversation of the weak variety takes places around
enhanced disclosure and improving executive compensation schemes
(Jackson 2012). The bulk of reformist thinking ventures beyond these
modest proposals. Some authors demand the encouragement of simple
innovations and the discouragement of complex ones (Judge 2012), stress
tests for bank holding companies performed every six months (Wall
2011), the inclusion of systemic risk-magnifying activities such as hedg-
ing transactions (and CDSs in particular) in regulatory oversight
(Fletcher 2014), and the restructuring of compensation schemes to align
incentives not only with diminished systemic risk, but also with long-
term investment strategies and creditor protection (Schwarcz 2012;
Squire 2010). Others still demand an end to the vague terms by which
shadow banking or systemic risk are defined in the existing laws and
demand the involvement of the judiciary in the receivership process of
financial institutions (Horton 2011).
A handful of reformists border on interventionism when they demand
the closing of regulatory arbitrage opportunities by regulating shadow
banks more tightly (Schwarcz 2012), including by extending the Basel III
reserve requirements to them (E. Lee 2014) and the tighter regulation of
securitization technologies so that they stop being ‘arbitrage delivery vehi-
cles’ (Borod 2011). These arguments are all critiques of the regulatory status
quo and if adopted they would constrain shadow banking more than the
Dodd-Frank-FSB frameworks do. However, they represent changes that do
not challenge the regulatory imperative of the existing frameworks: regu-
late shadow bankingmore lightly than conventional banking.
In short, shadow banking scholarship published in the top law journals
brings to the surface a world dominated by neoliberal ideas upheld by a
mix of professionals working for the financial sector and junior legal aca-
demics. Contrary to popular narratives about elite law schools as breed-
ing grounds for vested interests and privilege, our evidence suggests that
the law school mandarinate supply some of the most radical inter-
ventionist ideas available in this entire debate. But what positioning strat-
egies have these authors used and how much did this scholarly work
actually matter for IOs?
Positioning strategies and issue control
To understand how economists and lawyers positioned themselves in the
debate we did a comparative analysis of the professional experiences and
professional status of the identified 108 economists and lawyers writing
on shadow banking in scholarly journals. Our coding strategy was to
organize their professional experiences published in CVs into six fields:
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academia, domestic public sector, central banks, IOs, private financial
firms, and law firms.
The charts (in Figure 3) capture the results of the combined data on
professional experience and status. Each wedge is an individual career.
A large number of professionals had at least two kinds of professional
experiences in both categories of journals.
The evidence suggests a massive imbalance between the two profes-
sional groups. Critically, lawyers seemed keener to work on shadow
banking as an issue. More than twice as many lawyers entered the debate
than economists. While almost half of the cited references in the law jour-
nals are from economics, the economists published in the top economics
journals ignore the debates on shadow banking taking place in the law
journals (on similar dynamics in economics, see Fourcade et al. 2015). IO
economists also remain oblivious to lawyers’ research, a clear metric of
this professional group’s weak impact on the debate.
The network visualization in Figure 4 shows that economists published
in the top journals plug into references connected almost exclusively to
high-status US economic departments (Chicago, Yale, UPENN, Stanford,
MIT). While economists take the Fed research seriously, the work pro-
duced by the BIS and the IMF is marginal while the FSB’s work is
completely ignored. If academic economists matter at all for global
Figure 3 Professional experience and status in article journals on shadow
banking.
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shadow banking regulation, they do not matter via their high prestige
publications.
PROFESSIONAL EXPERTISE AND THE TECHNOCRACY
OF GLOBAL SHADOW BANKING REGULATION
Measurement: the FSB’s constitutionalized reformism
Of the three IOs, the FSB is the newest, most informal and most impor-
tant institution in the shadow banking regulation regime (Helleiner
2010). Born from the scramble of the G-20 to monitor, advise, and
Figure 4 Top economics journal authors and their cited allies.
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coordinate regulatory efforts in the aftermath of the Lehman crisis, the
FSB emerged as the main site of expert deliberations about the future
design of the global financial system. In the words of Treasury Secretary
Tim Geithner, it stood to become ‘a fourth pillar’ of the global economic
governance architecture (Griffith-Jones et al. 2010; Wouters and Oder-
matt 2011; see Helleiner 2012 for a skeptical take).
Soon after its establishment, the FSB was tasked to put together the first
international policy response to shadow banking-specific issues. The FSB
publishes Policy Framework and Global Monitoring reports focused on
shadow banking (see FSB 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d; 2014 for overviews).
It also created specialized working groups and institutional partnerships
with central banks and other IOs. By 2015 the FSB shadow banking moni-
toring processes covered 90% of banking assets and 80% of global GDP.
Systemically important central banks and the IMF conduct their own
assessments of the shadow banking system using the FSB’s annual moni-
toring reports. Indeed, the FSB’s definitions of shadow banking and its
perspective on the sector’s strengths and weaknesses have become part
of the canon (see FSB 2014 for an overview).
A close reading of these regular reports from the 2011–2014 period
shows that they cover the entire reformist side of the spectrum. In terms
of the sources cited by FSB economists (see Figure 2 above), there is exten-
sive reliance on the Fed and the IMF expertise followed, by some way, the
ECB and elite economics departments. A very diverse set of institutions,
from the high-prestige French central bank to an obscure Portuguese uni-
versity make up the universe of the less systematically cited sources.
On the weakly reformist end of this spectrum, the FSB has advocated
for a system-wide monitoring system designed to track down the build-
up of systemic risks and to ignite corrective action when needed. As a
result, the FSB has morphed into the main initiator and coordinator of
policy measures aiming to reduce the build-up of systemic leverage,
maturity, and liquidity mismatching. Specifically, the FSB integrated the
wider calls made by most scholars that systemic risks endogenous to
shadow banking activities deserve monitoring. Its regional consultative
groups implemented this objective by conducting annual monitoring
exercises and publishing results that name and shame laggards. Simi-
larly, the FSB cooperated with the private sector and central banks to col-
lect global data on securities financing transactions. A FSB-IOSCO
partnership resulted in the implementation of guidelines on how to
make securitization processes simpler and more transparent. As a result,
this IO has also become the world’s largest data collection and aggrega-
tion machine on shadow banking issues. The FSB is a technocratic
expert-based institution that is also backed by state power (Reisenbichler
2015).
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On the strongly reformist end of the spectrum, the FSB went further
than Dodd-Frank in constraining shadow banking by proposing financial
soft law that targets specific activities and entities with high systemic
risk. This is reflected in the FSB’s assembly of five shadow banking work-
ing groups, with three working on shadow banking entities and two on
activities. It also asked the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(BCBS) to draft policies meant to stem the spill-over of risks from the
shadow banking system to conventional banks (the so-called
‘interconnectedness’ problem). But although off-balance sheet interac-
tions between conventional banks and shadow banks have powered the
Lehman crisis, the BCBS has failed to offer guidelines for prudential reg-
ulation applicable to these interactions, such as instruments to limit the
size and nature of a bank’s exposures to shadow banking entities, or risk-
based capital requirements for banks’ exposures. In contrast, the FSB-
IOSCO partnership has been more successful at diffusing clear standards
(subsequently adopted by US and EU authorities) on regulation and
management of MMMFs across national jurisdictions. Similarly, by 2014
the FSB adopted numerical and qualitative standards to cut and calculate
haircuts on collateral used in the repo market. The measure was designed
to limit the build-up of excessive leverage in non-banks and reduce the
procyclicality of that leverage.
The FSB’s thinking and actions generally reflect the solid reformism of
mainstream economics, albeit without any of the interventionist tempta-
tions one could find among some of the senior brokers coming from
what we have identified as the creme de la creme. FSB staff have con-
trolled agenda setting discussions by ‘firewalling’ definitions of what
shadow banking is and then focusing on measurements used in policy to
control how shadow banking is assessed. Debates on how to define and
measure shadow banking inevitably flow back to the FBS staff.
Mandate: the IMF’s balancing of intervention and reformism
Although the Fund published working papers on shadow banking
(Claessens et al. 2012; Singh and Aitken 2010), it was not until its 2014
Global Fiscal Stability Report that the IMF took an official and public posi-
tion on what is to be done about shadow banking (IMF 2014, chapter 2).
The network analysis presented in Figure 2 (above) shows that the
Fund’s position relies for economic expertise on its own staff, the FSB
and the Fed, with academic and private sector institutions taking a back-
seat. Eight out of the twelve economists cited in the sections of the report
that have policy implications are IMF staff, most of them from the IMF’s
Research Department. The others are two NYU economists and two law-
yers from a prominent New York law firm (Clearly Gootlieb Steen
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Hamilton LLP) that services some of the largest banks and non-financial
firms in a dozen countries. The presence of lawyers from global law firms
on the IMF’s lineup of advocates of interventionism is intriguing consid-
ering the otherwise marginal role of scholarly legal research.
On content, the Fund has tried to shadow the FSB’s initiatives but it has
also gone further in the direction of interventionist policy advice, an out-
come one may attribute to the different expert network the Fund relies
on. As such, the IMF has begun to push the FSB from the ‘left’ corner of
the debate. Specifically, like the other two IOs analyzed here, the Fund
has not been ready to treat shadow banking as a villain, as the radical
interventionist would have it, or to lionize it to the point of letting its
problems be solved privately, as orthodox neoliberals suggest.
Some of the IMF thinking on this issue is illustrative of mild reformism:
greater transparency, international coordination on risk monitoring. But
unlike the other two IOs involved, the IMF economists have been very
explicit about their strong reformism and often venture into intervention-
ist thinking. The 2014 GFSR openly states that two of the main objectives
of regulation should be to shrink the size of shadow banking and curtail
opportunities for regulatory arbitrage in exchange for the provision of
public safety nets. Bolder still, Fund economists make it clear that any
forms of shadow banking growth linked to regulatory arbitrage should
be effectively repressed using the same regulatory tools applied to con-
ventional banks, such as restrictions on leverage, maturity, or liquidity
transformation. The boldest interventionist statement is that ‘the lack of a
safety net means that, for a given contribution to systemic risk, more con-
servative regulatory measures are needed for shadow banks than for
banks’ (IMF 2014). Such measures concern not only reserve requirements,
but also the curtailment of the scope for regulatory arbitrage via the
extension of monitoring from entities to shadow banking functions. Such
monitoring would require the establishment of a public authority that
could make decisions regarding the use of collateral (IMF 2014: 24).
The Fund’s main entry point in the debate is its invocation of the IMF’s
global mandate regarding the nexus between fiscal and financial issues,
including training and technical assistance. Its economists suggest that
the strictness of regulations should increase with the level of leverage
and warn that treasuries should not become mere appendices of shadow
banks by accepting to supply the volume of safe assets that shadow
banks demand (see Gabor in this issue). Instead, regulators should
impose restrictions on new financial instruments. The Fund’s experts
argue against the unconditional extension of public backstops to shadow
banks and make the case that such safety nets should be put in place only
in exchange for collateral and governance conditions. In making such
arguments they also pose as constructive critics of the FSB’s milder kind
of reformism. As one senior IMF staff member put it, the FSB’s policy
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approach ‘does not gauge the risks that shadow banking poses to the
financial system’ and ‘does not measure the amount of debt used to pur-
chase assets (often called leverage), the degree to which the system can
amplify problems, or the channels through which problems move from
one sector to another’ (Kodres 2013: 43).
Status: BIS experts and varieties of reformism
Known as the ‘bank of central banks’ the Bank of International Settle-
ments is a critical node in the governance of the global financial sector.
Since the Lehman crisis the BIS has emerged as one of the main suppliers
of knowledge and policy templates regarding the challenges posed by
shadow banking.
Unlike the FSB, the opinions of the BIS are richly footnoted and refer-
enced, thus enabling the examination of its networks of insider and out-
sider experts. We looked at 89 authors and their 12 co-authors and
mapped their connections. The findings suggest that the BIS also relies
on its own experts to deal with shadow banking issues, with a few co-
authors based in universities, think tanks, and central banks. Most of the
authors are BIS staff, with the bulk of research coming from the
institution’s own monetary policy, statistics and research departments
(in this order). Unlike in the case of the more elitist IMF, the academic co-
authors of BIS staff come from prominent (Cass, Berkeley, Peterson Insti-
tute) as well as less prominent institutions (Keynes College, Hanken
School of Economics, Helsinki).
A closer look suggests that the BIS intervenes in the shadow banking
debate by asserting its high status as the greatest depository of experi-
ence-based policy expertise. When we unpack the career sequences of
the economists responsible for taking a stand on shadow banking issues
we found that almost a third of the BIS staff involved in the debate were
experts who have gone through the revolving door between at least two
of the following social domains before their BIS appointment: academia,
domestic public sector institutions, public IOs, and the private financial
sector. For example, BIS’s head of the Monetary and Economic Policy
Department (Claudio Borio) was also a professor at Oxford and a senior
economist at the OECD. Jaime Caruana served as governor of the Bank of
Spain, advisor to the IMF’s managing director and head of Money and
Capital Markets Department at the same institution, all after having
spent 10 years in private finance. One of the most prolific experts is
Adrian van Rixtel, a senior economist at BIS who has experience as a
researcher for the central banks of Spain, Japan, and the Netherlands, a
professor at the prestigious European business school Instituto Empresa
and a research economist for a number of London and Amsterdam-based
private financial institutions.
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Many BIS staffers have private sector experience, mostly in financial
consulting, the economics and research departments of global banks
(Deutsche, Citi, Santander), and credit card companies. An even larger
percentage went through the revolving door between the BIS and the
international civil service track offered by international development
banks (World Bank, EBRD, IADB), international think tanks (OECD,
Woodrow Wilson) and the IMF. A similar percentage had academic
appointments in economics departments and business schools with
mixed levels of status (ranging from the University of New South Wales,
Bonn, Zagreb up to Chicago School of Business, Princeton, the Wharton
School, Oxford, Warwick, and Instituto Empresa Madrid). The majority
of BIS staff writing on shadow banking come from national central banks
and ministries of finance, with a smattering of national financial regula-
tory commissions and heads of state economic councils in the back-
ground. Compared to IMF staffers BIS authors have careers that are less
dedicated to the institution.
Intellectually, the BIS is a solidly reformist institution, but unlike the
IMF, it hesitates to come anywhere near interventionism. While it is not
always addressed explicitly, the overall approach of BIS, and more spe-
cifically, the BCBS, toward shadow banking is to target and correct for
market failures that occur in the complex linkages between non-bank
financial institutions and the traditional banking system. Since 2008, sev-
eral members of the BIS management spoke publicly about the regulation
of shadow banks via the traditional banking channel (Basel III) and the
supervision of the overall financial system.
The overall tone in initial speeches on shadow banking was one of cau-
tious reformism. In 2012, General Manager Jaime Caruana suggested
merely monitoring of the evolution of shadow banking and, where called
for, considering regulation of the shadow banking system in areas where
systemic risk and regulatory arbitrage appear. But by 2014 Caruana took
a more aggressive stance, praising initiatives to set minimum haircuts for
certain securities lending transactions and reduce the risks associated
with money market funds. The toughening of the stance of others in the
BIS management (Stefan Walter, Secretary General of the BCBS, and Ste-
phan Cecchetti, former Economic Advisor and Head of the Monetary
and Economic Department) is evident in their advocacy for integrating
regulatory policy recommendations on shadow banking directly in the
context of the Basel standards. The BIS research staff fleshed out these
positions further. This happened particularly after 2014, when the BIS
research department was packed with heavyweights from academia who
had cut their teeth in academic debates on shadow banking regulation
during the previous five years. Of these the most notable new hire was
Hyun Song Shin as its Economics Advisor and Head of Research, former
Professor at Princeton, member of the Federal Reserve of New York,
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among other high prestige positions, and a highly cited author on
shadow banking. The BIS relies heavily on its own staff on shadow bank-
ing and brought in high prestige economists to boost its capacity. Its lack
of reformist zeal may be, in part, a function of its status.
CONCLUSIONS
Using a mix of network analysis, content, and career analysis we have pro-
vided an assessment of the ‘grey matter’ in shadow banking expertise.
Three main sets of findings stand out. First, instead of stasis, the crisis
ignited an extensive recalibration of pre-crisis policy knowledge and ideas
about how to regulate finance. Overall, the direction of this recalibration
has been towards an uneasy reformism that straddles the post-Lehman
appetite for interventionism and the pro-market orthodoxy so familiar to
the pre-Lehman world. That said, in professional fields as diverse as the
IMF and select academic circles we have identified relatively few inter-
ventionist calls for very restrictive regulation, with most made by promi-
nent American legal scholars. Future comparative research could establish
if reformist ideas are more likely to have weight on new issues that are
not covered in mainstream economics before the crisis.
Second, there is overwhelming evidence that the thinking of the emerg-
ing global regulatory regime on this issue is shaped most extensively by
IO staff that sit at the core. With the exception of the Fed, all other actors
(academic economists, legal scholars, private sector experts) have been
allowed to join the debate on a very selective basis.
Given the highly legalistic character of shadow banking actors and
activities, we expected lawyers to have influence in these debates. They
do not. Similarly, scholars who assume a smooth flow of ideas between
elite economics departments and IOs would be puzzled by our findings.
Rather than relying on academic economists’ ideas, IO staff used them
selectively to boost their own claims to expertise (see also Lindvall 2009).
Surprisingly, the argument that academic status in economics translates
into policy relevance seems overblown, at least in the case of shadow
banking.
Moreover, the academic economists that had potential influence on IO
staff came from business schools not economics departments and their
role as knowledge brokers between IOs is a reflection of their profes-
sional culture and incentives rather than the prestige of their employing
institution. In general, the role of Fed economists dwarfed that of aca-
demic institutions and acted as the main knowledge broker among the
three IOs. Working papers from IOs and think tanks are often far more
important carriers of policy ideas and knowledge than top economics
journals.
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The finding regarding IO staff dominance does not reinforce the view
that IOs can be studied in isolation, as some kind of professional silos.
Rather, our findings highlight how even IO staff working on highly tech-
nical issues like shadow banking call on outside expert networks, and
other IO staff, to assert the authority of their expertise on an issue. We
suggest that professional fields operate as ‘linked ecologies’, with experts
using connections between IOs, academia, think tanks, and domestic reg-
ulatory institutions to substantiate their claims to expertise. Professionals
then fight over issue control, calling upon their preferred professional
and organizational networks to do so. This article contributes to a grow-
ing body of work maps professional competition among transnational
and supranational policy elites (Lebaron 2013; Mudge and Vauchez 2016;
Seabrooke and Wigan 2016).
Third, we suggest that such an environment calls upon IO staff to then
differentiate themselves from their peers and adopt different strategies.
We have described how the IO staff studied used measurement, mandate,
and status to treat shadow banking with greater flexibility and authority.
We found that the FSB’s strategy was to leverage its authority to define
what shadow banking is and to measure its size and interconnectedness
with conventional banking. In contrast, the IMF deployed its macroeco-
nomic mandate to take positions on shadow banking that link financial
and fiscal policy issues. Finally, the BIS used the high status awarded to
of its professionals as seasoned financial sector regulators to claim juris-
diction over agenda setting in shadow banking regulation.
This article raises several questions for further research. To what extent
is this largely inward-looking conversation of the BIS-IMF-FSB triad an
outgrowth of previously existing expert networks and network dynamics
left untouched by the financial crisis? What explains the weak influence
of academic publications from economists and lawyers, given how they
are held in high regard in our own academic community? What is the
relationship between the production of regulatory knowledge and the
role of business school as opposed to elite economics departments in uni-
versities? (see Fourcade and Khurana 2013).
Finally, this article provides some tools for investigating claims from
professional groups over what are appropriate ideas and knowledge on
an issue of great importance in the international political economy. We
appreciate that this is a first take on understanding this complex world of
expert claims on a highly technical transnational issue, but hope that in
outlining the ‘grey matter’ in shadow banking we have shed some light.
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